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1Abstract
The paper investigates socially optimal patterns of economic growth and environmen-
tal quality in a neoclassical growth model with endogenous technological progress. In
the model, the environmental quality aﬀects positively not only to utility but also to
production. However, cleaner technologies can be used in the economy whether a part
of the output is used in environmentally oriented R&D. In this framework, if the initial
level of capital is low then the shadow price of a cleaner technology is low relative to the
cost of developing it given by the marginal utility of consumption and it is not worth
investing in R&D. Thus, there will be a ﬁrst stage of growth based only on the accumula-
tion of capital with a decreasing environmental quality until the moment that pollution is
great enough to make proﬁtable the investment in R&D. After this turning point, if the
new technologies are eﬃcient enough, the economy can evolve along a balanced growth
path with an increasing environmental quality. The result is that the optimal investment
pattern supports an environmental Kuznets curve.
Keywords: neoclassical growth model, endogenous technological progress, external
eﬀects, environmental Kuznets curve.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: O33, O41, Q55, Q56.
21 Introduction
Since the publication in the early nineties of several works suggesting that some pollu-
tants follow an inverse-U-shaped pattern relative to countries’ incomes, see, for instance,
World Bank (1992), Selden and Song (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1995), the issue
of the pollution-income relation has become one of the most important subjects in the
ﬁeld of environmental economics. Although the literature on the issue is mainly empir-
ical, several papers have oﬀered a theoretical explanation of this phenomenon, see John
and Pecchenino (1994), Selden and Song (1995) and Stokey (1998).1 In the ﬁrst two pa-
pers, non-negativity constraints apply on expenditure on pollution abatement for a given
technology. John and Pecchenino (1994) study the eﬀects of non-negativity constraints
on the evolution of environmental quality in the framework of an overlapping generations
model where pollution depends positively on consumption and negatively on abatement,
whereas Selden and Song (1995) use the neoclassical growth model with pollution ﬁrst an-
alyzed by Forster (1973) where pollution depends positively on capital and negatively on
abatement.2 However, in Stokey’s (1998) paper an AK model with technological change
is analyzed. She assumes that there is a continuous of technologies that can be used. The
diﬀerent technologies are characterized by an index, between zero and unity, that deﬁnes
the emission rate for the production process. In this framework an EKC appears because
during a ﬁrst stage it is optimal to produce with the dirtiest technology. Nevertheless,
although sustained growth is possible it is not optimal. The explanation for why growth
ceases is related to the fact that after substituting the pollution function into the pro-
duction function, this presents constant returns to scale with respect to the capital stock
and the pollution but a decreasing marginal productivity for capital.
In this paper, we extend the neoclassical growth model proposed by Forster (1973)
1A theoretical explanation of the EKC can be already found in Gruver (1976). This author analyzes
a linear growth model with two types of capital, the productive capital and the pollution control capital.
However, as the pollution control capital is not productive, the economy evolves to an steady state
without growth.
2More recently, Lieb (2004) has extended John and Pecchenino’s (1994) model to two pollutants, a
stock pollutant as in John and Pecchenino (1994) and a ﬂow pollutant.
3in two directions. First, we assume that environmental quality aﬀects not only to con-
sumer’s welfare but also to production through its positive eﬀect on the productivity of
labor and also on the productivity of capital. This positive eﬀect of the environment on
productivity was already considered in the World Bank (1992) report. In this report it is
recognized that the main channel through which pollution aﬀect productivity is through
its negative eﬀect on human health. Poor health causes considerable economic losses not
o n l yb e c a u s ei ta ﬀects workers’ participation in the labour market and their productivity,
but also because it aﬀects worker’s learning abilities. On the other hand, a lower quality
of the environment can increase physical depreciation or cause important losses of the
capital stock as a consequence of the extreme meteorological phenomena. In accordance
with this perspective we assume that environmental quality is (indirectly) a production
factor. Mohtadi (1996) and Smulders and Gradus (1996) follow this approach in their
analysis of pollution abatement on growth.3 More recently Cassou and Hamilton (2004)
have also adopted this approach in their investigation of the optimal patterns of economic
development in a two-sector endogenous growth model with clean and dirty goods. A
second extension is that we assume that cleaner technologies can be used in the economy
whether a part of the output is used in environmentally oriented R&D. In this case, as
environmental quality aﬀects production, the investment in R&D to develop cleaner tech-
nologies also enhances the productivity of capital and labor. For this growth model with
endogenous technological progress, we ﬁnd that, for a given initial technology and capital
stock, if the initial level of capital is low then the shadow price of a cleaner technology is
low relative to the cost of developing it and it is not worth investing in R&D. Thus, there
will be a ﬁrst stage of growth based only on the accumulation of physical capital with an
increasing pollution until the moment that pollution is great enough to make proﬁtable
the investment in R&D to develop cleaner technologies. Then if the new technologies
are eﬃc i e n te n o u g hi ti sp o s s i b l et og r o w t ha l o n gab a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t h( B G P )w i t h
an increasing environmental quality. The result is that the optimal investment pattern
supports an inverted-U-shaped pattern of pollution to countries’ incomes.
3Schou (2000) also follows this approach in his study of the eﬀects of pollution on long-run growth
when pollution is caused by the use of a non-renewable resource.
4In the paper we also investigate which can be the eﬀects of greener preferences on
growth. Our investigation shows that the eﬀect of greener preferences on growth can be
positive or negative depends on the degree of environmental conscience of consumers. In
particular, we ﬁnd that the lower the degree of environmental conscience of consumers,
the greater the possibilities that greener preferences lead to an increase in the growth
rate. Nevertheless, for the numerical simulation developed in Section 4 we ﬁnd that
there is no conﬂict between the environmental preservation and the economic growth
whatever is the degree of environmental conscience of consumers. The positive eﬀect of
greener preferences on growth occurs because greener preferences increase the investment
in R&D causing an increase in productivity that can support a greater rate of growth
for the economy. Another characteristic of our model is that it presents multiple long-
run equilibria (global indeterminacy). We show that this characteristic arises because
of the positive externality of environmental quality on consumer’s welfare. Nevertheless,
we ﬁnd that only for one of the two equilibria the model presents, a sustained growth is
guaranteed. Finally, we would add that along the BGP our model behaves as an AK model
since the output can be written as a linear function of capital. This property explains
why growth in our model is compatible with an increasing environmental quality whereas
this is not the case in Stokey’s (1998) model that in the long-run behaves as a neoclassical
growth model with decreasing marginal productivity for capital. As a consequence also
of this property, we ﬁnd that the BGP is unstable.
Several papers have studied the relationship among economic growth, environment
and technological change. See, for instance, Bovenberg and Smulders (1995,1996), Gri-
maud (1999), Reis (2001), Hart (2004), and more recently Ricci (2007) and Cunha-e-sá
and Reis (2007), Grimaud and Rouge (2008) and Reis et al. (2008). However, any of
these papers look for an explanation of the EKC. Nevertheless, our paper is close of that
written by Reis (2001). Although the model and the aim of the investigation developed
by Reis is diﬀerent to the model and the aim addressed in this paper, we look at the
investment in R&D in the same way except that we do not assume that the elasticities
of pollution function are equal to unity as it is assumed in Reis’ (2001) paper.
Other papers that include technological change in the theoretical analysis of the EKC
5are Jones and Manuelli (2001), Cassou and Hamilton (2004) and Hartman and Kwon
(2005).4 However, Jones and Manuelli (2001) focus, in the framework of an overlap-
ping generations model with a continuum of technologies indexed by “cleanliness”, on
showing how diﬀerent decision-making institutions can aﬀect the pollution-income re-
lationship. They ﬁnd that voting over (proportional) eﬄuent charges can generate an
EKC. Cassou and Hamilton (2004) investigate privately and socially optimal patterns of
economic growth in a two-sector endogenous growth model with clean and dirty goods.
They consider a second-best ﬁscal policy framework in which distortionary taxes jointly
inﬂuence economic growth and environmental quality. In this policy setting they ob-
tain the conditions that produce an EKC. In their model these conditions do not arise
with a consumption externality as it occurs in our model. Hartman and Kwon (2005)
adopt Stokey’s (1998) approach in the framework of a growth model with physical and
human capital where the human capital accumulation does not depend on pollution.
Consequently, the result is that an optimal sustained growth can be supported by the
accumulation of human capital.
Finally, we would like to present some comments on the scope of the paper and
t h ei m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h ee n v i r o n m e n t a lp o l i c yt h a tc a nb ed e r i v e df r o mo u rr e s u l t s . A
ﬁrst thing we would like to clarify is that our model could yield diﬀerent results for the
relationship between pollution and income depending mainly on the initial conditions
and on the cost of pollution abatement. Thus, the EKC is one of the patterns that
pollution can adopt. Other patterns could be optimal, but what we want to highlight in
this paper is that beginning from a pristine natural environment, it can be optimal to
postpone investment in abatement technology until a critical level of pollution is reached
so that, once this level is reached, if the costs of pollution abatement are not very high,
the economy could evolve along a BGP with increasing environmental quality. A second
point we would like to comment is that we cannot conclude from our model that just
4Kelly (2003) shows numerically how the shape of the emissions and pollution stock curves varies with
pollution speciﬁc parameters in the framework of a neoclassical growth model with constant population
and technology. For some parameter values he obtains an inverted U-shaped income-environment relation
when the measure of pollution is emissions.
6leaving the economy to growth the environmental problems as the climate change will
be solved in the future. The reasom why growth cannot be the solution for climate
change is that the environmental quality is a public good and as it is well known then
the decentralized equilibrium is not optimal. With external eﬀects in production and
consumption, polluting ﬁrms do not select the optimal level of investment in abatement
technology so that even if the conditions for the appearance of an EKC are satisﬁed
the decentralized equilibrium could yield a diﬀerent pattern of pollution to income with
increasing pollution. According to our results what we need to face the climate change
c h a l l e n g ei saw e l l - d e ﬁned environmental policy that promotes investment in abatement
technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section the model is presented. In
Section 3, the interior central planner solution is derived and the existence, multiplicity
and stability of the long-run equilibria are studied. The section ends with an investigation
of the eﬀects on growth of greener prferences. In Section 4, the transitional dynamics of
the model is analyzed and the conditions to obtain an EKC are established. This Section
also includes a numerical illustration with a sensitivity analysis of the results. Finally,
Section 5 contains the conclusions and future lines for research are mentioned.
2 The model
We consider a closed economy with constant population normalized to one. The intertem-





where Q stands for the ﬂow of environmental services, C for per capita consumption,
and the parameter ρ>0 for the rate of time preference.5 For simplicity, we assume that
U(Q,C) is additively separable and logarithmic,
U(Q,C)=φlnQ +l nC, φ > 0, (2)
5The time argument has been suppressed in this an all subsequent equations if no ambiguity arises.
7so that for a given combination (Q,C) the greater φ t h eg r e a t e rt h em a r g i n a lr a t eo fs u b -
stitution of consumption for environmental services (MRSCQ) and the consumer cares
more about the environment. For this utility function preferences are homothetic and
indiﬀerence curves strictly convex. Consequently, MRSCQ is decreasing.6 Moreover, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to unity. See e.g. Cassou and Hamil-
ton (2004), Grimaud and Rouge (2008) and Reis et al. (2008) for a logarithmic utility
speciﬁcation.
The production function is given by
Y = G(Q,K)=AQ
χK
β,A > 0,χ > 0 and β ∈ (0,1), (3)
where K is the capital-labor ratio. The parameter χ represents the positive eﬀect of
environmental quality on production.7 A c c o r d i n gt ot h i ss p e c i ﬁcation we are assuming
that natural environment is (indirectly) a factor of production so that the higher the
pollution, the lower the environmental quality provided by Q and the lower the output
for the same amount of capital and labor. Pollution can aﬀect either the productivity of
labor or/and deteriorate the physical capital hence for the same amounts of factors, the
output would be inversely related with pollution.
Following Forster’s model, the environmental quality depends negatively on capital,
to capture the polluting consequences of economic activity,
Q = Q(K,z)=K
−λz
γ,λ , γ> 0, (4)
where z is an index of the abatement technology used in the economy and λ,γ stand for
the elasticities of Q with respect to K and z.8 An increase in z implies an increase in
environmental services for the same stock of capital so that a higher z means a cleaner
6Some authors as Gradus and Smulders (1996) have incorporated a lower bound in environmental
quality that must be satisﬁed to sustain normal life and production. This is a natural assumption in
growth models with pollution. However, it is not so relevant when the long-run equilibrium supports an
inverted U-shaped pattern of pollution to income as it occurs for the growth model solved in this paper.
7In Forster (1973) and Selden and Song (1995) it is assumed that the environmental quality has no
eﬀect of production.
8The speciﬁcation of functions (3) and (4) were used by Smulders and Gradus (1996) in their analysis
8technology. But as environmental quality also aﬀects the productivity of capital, a higher
z also means a higher output for the same stock of capital. This positive eﬀect of tech-
nological progress on production can be explicitly recognized by substituting (4) in (3)
that yields: Y = AzγχKβ−λχ where we assume that β>λ χin order to guarantee that
the marginal productivity of capital is positive. According to this production function
t h er a t eo fg r o w t ho ft h eo u t p u ti sg i v e nb y
gY =( β − λχ)gK + γχgz,
where gz is the rate of technological progress. In this case, the economy only could reach
aB G Pw i t hgY = gK = gz provided that β − λχ + γχ =1 . From now, we assume that
this condition holds and we focus on the investigation of whether there exists a BGP and
which is the transitional dynamics. As β<1, this condition requires that λ<γthat
according to (4) implies that environmental quality is increasing along the BGP. In other
words, if the marginal productivity of capital is decreasing, it is only possible to reach a
BGP in the neoclassical framework if the elasticity of Q with respect to z is greater than
the elasticity of Q with respect to K.
Under this assumption, the production function can be written as
Y = F(z,K)=Az
1−αK
α, 1 − α = γχ, α = β − λχ, α ∈ (0,1) (5)
that it could be also written in terms of per unit of eﬀective labor as y = Akα where
y = Y/zand k = K/z. Notice that this speciﬁcation for the production function coincides
with the neoclassical production function with labor-augmenting technological progress
with the particularity that in our model the rate of technological progress is endogenous.
We now consider that the development of cleaner technologies is the result of invest-
ment in R&D. We consider that part of the output is used in a R&D sector and determine
the optimal rate of technological progress. The equation of motion for capital is:
˙ K = Az
1−αK
α − C − Iz,K (0) = K0 > 0. (6)
of the eﬀects of pollution control on long-run growth, although for these authors z stands for a control
variable (pollution abatement) whereas in this paper z stands for a state variable (abatement technology).
This approach corresponds to the one adopted by Reis (2001).
9where Iz is the investment in R&D.9 Thus, the rate of continuous technological progress
is endogenously determined through the decisions of investment in R&D:
˙ z = Iz,z (0) = z0 > 0. (7)
Reis (2001) assumes that investment in R&D is irreversible. This is a natural assump-
tion in our model as well as the economy can only grow in the long run if the investment
in R&D is positive. Nevertheless, we show that this assumption is not crucial for the
results obtained in this paper since along the BGP is not optimal to revert to dirtier
technologies. In fact, the only constraint we need to obtain an EKC is the irreversibility
of the initial value of z. To assume that z0, that can be interpreted as the dirtiest tech-
nology available, is a lower bound for z is enough to obtain that it could be optimal not
to invest in technological progress during a ﬁrst stage.
3 Endogenous technological progress
We now derive the central planner solution. This solution maximizes the utility of the
representative consumer (1), subject to (6) that describes the dynamics of capital and
(7) that shows the evolution of z, given the initial conditions.
Let H be the current-value Hamiltonian of the central planner’s problem
H = U(Q(K,z),C)+ν(F(z,K) − C − Iz)+µIz,
where ν and µ are the shadow prices of K and z.T h e ﬁrst-order necessary conditions
are10
9The assumption of zero depreciation has no qualitative eﬀects.
10For this problem the necessary conditions are not suﬃcient since the concavity of the Hamiltonian
is not guarantee for all non-negative values of (K,z,C,Iz). Notice that although the utility function is
concave, function (4) is convex with respect to K so that after eliminating Q from the utility function
the resulting function U(Q(K,z),C) is convex with respect to K.
10∂H
∂C
= UC − ν =0 , (8)
∂H
∂Iz
= −ν + µ ≤ 0,I z ≥ 0, (µ − ν)Iz =0 , (9)
˙ ν = ρν − (UQQK + νFK), (10)
˙ µ = ρµ − (UQQz + νFz), (11)





−ρt =0 . (12)
Condition (9) implies that if ν>µthen Iz =0 , meaning that if the shadow price of
a cleaner technology is too low relative to the cost of developing it given by the marginal
utility of consumption, then this technological development is not worth investing in.
Thus, for developing cleaner technologies it is necessary that ν = µ. In this case it follows
from (10)-(11) that the net returns on investment in capital and in R&D must be equal
UQQK + UCFK = UQQZ + UCFz,
w h e r et h en e tr e t u r no ni n v e s t m e n ti nc a p i t a li sg i v e nb yt h ep o s i t i v ev a l u eo ft h em a r g i n a l
productivity of capital, UCFK, less the value of the negative eﬀe c tt h a tt h ec a p i t a lh a so n
utility through the deterioration of environmental quality, UQQK, whereas the net return
on investment in R&D is given by the positive value of the marginal productivity of a
cleaner technology, UCFz, plus the value of the positive eﬀect that a cleaner technology
h a so nu t i l i t yt h r o u g ha ni m p r o v e m e n to fe n v i r o n m e n t a lq u a l i t y ,UQQz.
























that can be rewritten as
−φλx + αAk
α−1 = φγkx +( 1− α)Ak
α, (14)
where x is the ratio of consumption to capital and k the capital per unit of eﬀective labor.
11Condition (13) deﬁnes implicitly an optimal policy function for x :
x(k)=
(α − (1 − α)k)A
φ(λk1−α + γk2−α)
, (15)
This rule establishes that to obtain a positive ratio of consumption to physical capital,
k must be lower than α/(1 − α).
Diﬀerentiating (15) with respect to time, the rate of growth of x is obtained as a












2 − α((1 − α)λ +( 2− α)γ)k − α(1 − α)λ, (17)
p2(k)=γ(1 − α)k
2 +( ( 1− α)λ − αγ)k − αλ. (18)





(αγ +( 1− α)λ)Akα
λ + γk
− ρ, (19)










(αγ +( 1− α)λ)Akα
λ + γk
− (ρ + gK), (20)
where gK = ˙ K/K.
Then equaling (20) to (16), the rate of growth of k can be written as a function of





(αγ +( 1− α)λ)Akα
λ + γk





On the other hand, using the resource constraint and the optimal policy function for
x, the rate of technological progress, gz, can be obtained as a function of the rate of
growth of the capital
gz =
(φγ +1− α)Ak1+α − (α − φλ)Akα
φ(λ + γk)
− kgK, (22)
12so that the rate of growth of k can be also written as
˙ k
k
= gK − gz =( 1+k)gK −
(φγ +1− α)Ak1+α − (α − φλ)Akα
φ(λ + γk)
. (23)
Then equaling (23) to (21) the optimal policy function for gK is obtained
gK(k)=
(φγ +1− α)Ak1+α − (α − φλ)Akα
φ(λ + γk)((1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k))
p1(k) (24)
+
φρ(λ + γk) − φ(αγ +( 1− α)λ)Akα
φ(λ + γk)((1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k))
p2(k).
Finally, (24) can be used in (22) to obtain the optimal policy function for gz :
gz(k)=
(φγ +1− α)Ak1+α − (α − φλ)Akα
φ(λ + γk)((1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k))
p1(k)
−
φρ(λk + γk2)+( 1− α)(1 + φ(γ − λ))Ak1+α − (α − φλ)Akα
φ(λ + γk)((1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k))
p2(k) (25)




φρ(λ +( λ + γ)k + γk2)
φ(λ + γk)((1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k))
p2(k)
−
(1 + φ(γ − λ))(α − (1 − α)k)Akα
φ(λ + γk)((1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k))
p2(k), (26)
This result establishes that the dynamics of the model can be summarized in the ﬁrst-
order diﬀerential equation (26) and initial condition k0 = K0/z0.
3.1 Long-run equilibrium and global indeterminacy
This subsection focuses on a long-run general equilibrium in which the economy can
growth a constant rate. An interior BGP is a temporal path deﬁned by a vector (ˆ k, ˆ x, ˆ g)
such that ˆ k solves ˙ k =0 , the transversality conditions are satisﬁe d ,a n dt h er a t eo fg r o w t h
of environmental quality ˆ gQ is given by (γ − λ)ˆ g a c c o r d i n gt o( 4 ) .
The stationary condition, ˙ k =0 , yields the following equation11
φρ(λ +( λ + γ)ˆ k + γˆ k
2)=( 1+φ(γ − λ))(α − (1 − α)ˆ k)Aˆ k
α. (27)
11We do not take into account the solution given by equation p2(ˆ w)=0since according to (16) the rate
of growth of the ratio of consumption to capital is not well deﬁned in this case. Notice that, according
to (16), for p2(w)=0 , ˙ x/x is equal to −∞ · 0.
13The main task is to solve this equation for ˆ k. The study of this equation leads to the
following results12
Proposition 1 For any vector (α,γ,λ,ρ,φ), a positive lower bound ˜ A can be deﬁned such
that: (i) if A> ˜ A then there exist two solutions, ˆ k1 and ˆ k2, where 0 < ˆ k1 < ˆ k2 <α / (1−α);
(ii) if A = ˜ A then there exists a unique solution, ˆ k,where 0 < ˆ k<α 2/(1 − α2).
⇒ FIGURE 1 ⇐
Case (i) is shown in Fig. 1. Therefore, we can have multiple (two) long-run values for
the capital per unit of eﬀective labor. In turn, each value supports a diﬀerent BGP, at
which consumption and capital grow at a common constant rate of technological progress.
Thus, we have
Corollary 1 Under the conditions in Proposition 1, case (i), there exist multiple BGPs
and hence there is global indeterminacy.
To understand what causes multiplicity, it is convenient to consider two particular
cases of this model. First, when the consumer does not care about the environment, i.e.
when φ =0in (2) above, optimality condition (13) implies that ˆ k is unique and equal to
α/(1 − α) in all time periods. According to Prop. 1, this means that the long-run value
of k for this particular case is an upper bound for the solutions of our model. Without
an e g a t i v ee ﬀect of pollution on consumer’s utility, investment in R&D will be lower in
relative terms yielding a greater ˆ k. For the second particular case, environmental quality
does not aﬀect production, i.e. χ =0in (3). In this case, there exist also multiple BGPs
and consequently global indeterminacy. Notice that according to (5) α = β and 1−α =0
if χ =0 . In this case Eq. (27) is written as
φρ(λ +( λ + γ)ˆ k + γˆ k
2)=( 1+φ(γ − λ))βAˆ k
β,
and a similar proposition to Prop. 1 is obtained. Therefore, for a range of parameter
values, multiplicity of long-run equilibria arises because of the positive externality of
environmental quality on consumer’s welfare.
12The proof is straightforward and for this reason has been omitted from the paper.
14Next, we focus on the properties of the diﬀerent BGPs. From now we assume that
A is greater than ˜ A and we focus on long-run values ˆ k1 and ˆ k2 of case (i). Using the
optimal policy function for x deﬁned by (15) is immediate that the ratio of consumption
to physical capital, ˆ x1, associated with ˆ k1 is higher than the ratio of consumption to
physical capital, ˆ x2, associated with ˆ k2. Moreover, both ratios, ˆ x1 and ˆ x2, are positive
according to (15) since both ˆ k1 and ˆ k2 are lower than α/(1 − α). See Prop. 1 and Fig.
1. In this case, the transversality conditions are fulﬁl l e db e c a u s ei ti se a s yt os h o wt h a t
they are equivalent to have a long-run equilibrium with a positive ratio of consumption
to capital and a positive value of capital per unit of eﬀective labor.
On the other hand, the rate of growth will be positive depending on the value of A.
If we look at the rate of growth given by (19), it is pretty clear that for an enough high
value of A, t h er a t eo fg r o w t hi sp o s i t i v ei ni n t e r v a l(¯ k1,¯ k2) deﬁned by equation
(αγ +( 1− α)λ)Ak
α = ρ(λ + γk), (28)
see Fig. 2, where k = αλ/(1 − α)γ yields the maximum rate of growth that can be
reached by the economy. Moreover, it is also pretty obvious that ¯ k1 decreases and ¯ k2
increases when A increases as an increase in A shifts the LHS of Eq. (28) upward and
that limA→+∞ ¯ k1 =0and limA→+∞ ¯ k2 =+ ∞.
⇒ FIGURE 2 ⇐
Thus, to ﬁnd out whether the rate of growth is positive we need to establish the
relative position of ¯ k1,¯ k2,ˆ k1 and ˆ k2 on the horizontal axis of Fig. 1 and 2. First, we focus
on ˆ k2. This value increases with A since an increase in A shifts the RHS of Eq. (27)
upward. For this reason, we have to expect that for an high enough value of A, ˆ k2 is
higher than ¯ k1 that decreases with A. On the other hand, both ¯ k2 and ˆ k2 increase with
A but whereas limA→+∞ ¯ k2 =+ ∞, we have that limA→+∞ ˆ k2 = α/(1 − α) then we have
to expect also that for an high enough value of A, ˆ k2 be lower than ¯ k2.
Thus, we have
Proposition 2 For a high enough value of A,a tl e a s tt h er a t eo fg r o w t h ,ˆ g2, associated
with ˆ k2, is positive.
15With a positive rate of growth, the environmental quality only can be preserved
when γ ≥ λ according to function (4) and growth is only compatible with the EKC,
that requires that environmental quality ultimately increases, when γ>λ .A sw eh a v e
assumed that γ is greater than λ, environmental quality is increasing along the BGP.
As regards the sign of the rate of growth associated with ˆ k1 we cannot say nothing with
generality except that in this case it cannot be avoided the possibility of a non-growing
long-run equilibrium.13
Thus, we have two long-run equilibria, one with a relative high value of capital per
unit of eﬀective labor and a low ratio of consumption to capital and the other with a
relative low value of capital per unit of eﬀective labor and a high ratio of consumption
to physical capital, and, we can state that, at least, the former supports a BGP with a
positive rate of growth and decreasing pollution.
3.2 Stability of the long-run equilibrium
We will now investigate local stability around the BGPs. To analyze stability we rewrite






LHS(k)=φρ(λ +( λ + γ)k + γk
2), (30)
RHS(k)=( 1 + φ(γ − λ))(α − (1 − α)k)Ak
α, (31)
D(k)=φ(λ + γk)((1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k)), (32)
and LHS(k) stands for the left-hand side of Eq. (27) and RHS(k) for the right-hand












13Eq. (19) could give a negative growth rate but then the non-negativity constraint applies. In fact,
this is the result obtained in the numerical example.




(LHS0(ˆ k2) − RHS0(ˆ k2))p2(ˆ k2)ˆ k2D(ˆ k2)
D(ˆ k2)2 (33)
since by deﬁnition LHS(ˆ k2) − RHS(ˆ k2) is zero at the stationary point.
From Fig. 1, it is pretty clear that LHS0(ˆ k2) >R HS 0(ˆ k2). Moreover, this relationship
holds even if ˆ k2 is on the left of α2/(1−α2), the maximum of the RHS(k) represented in
Fig.1. Next, we study the sign of p2(k). As p2(k) is a quadratic, strictly convex function
with a negative independent term, p2(k)=0presents a unique positive root given by
ˆ k =
−((1 − α)λ − αγ)+
p






so that p2(k) is negative on the left of α/(1 − α), the intersection point of the RHS(k)
with the horizontal axis, and hence p2(ˆ k2) is also negative since according to Prop. 1 ˆ k2
is lower than α/(1−α). Thus, to determine the sign of (33), what we need is to ﬁnd out
the sign of D(ˆ k2).
The sign of D(ˆ k2) depends on the sing of (1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k) given that λ + γk
is positive for ˆ k2 positive. See (32) above. Developing this expression we obtain the
following three-degree polynomial in k
(1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k)=( 1 − α)
2γk
3 − α((3 − 2α)γ +( 1− α)λ)k
2
−(1 − α)(αγ +( 1+2 α)λ)k + α
2λ.











































(1 − α)2(αγ +( 1− α)λ) < 0. (36)
Then, as these two values of the polynomial are negative and the independent term is
positive, equation (1 + k)p1(k) − p2(k)=0 , according to Descartes’ rule of signs for
17polynomial equations, has two positive roots being the polynomial positive on the left of
the lower root and on the right of the higher root. Thus, the polynomial must be negative
in interval [α2/(1 − α2),α/(1 − α)] and consequently D(k) is negative, at least, in this
interval and we can conclude that
Proposition 3 If ˆ k2 belongs to interval [α2/(1−α2),α/(1−α)], then the long-run equi-
librium (ˆ k2, ˆ x2,ˆ g2) is unstable.
If ˆ k2 is on the left of α2/(1−α2) surely it is also unstable and if it is enough close to
α2/(1−α2) on the left it is also unstable without doubt. As regards the other equilibrium
(ˆ k1, ˆ x1, ˆ g1) nothing can be said with generality although we expect that this equilibrium
is also unstable. This conjecture is based on the fact that along the BGP our model
behaves as an AK model since the output can be written as a linear function of capital,
Y = Aˆ kα−1K, and it is well-known that the lack of transitional dynamics characterizes
this kind of growth model so that we expect that our model inherits this property for
the diﬀerent equilibria. Moreover, this is the case for the numerical example developed
in Section 4.1.
3.3 The eﬀects on growth of greener preferences
Next, we study the eﬀects of a change in φ on the BGPs. In this Section we focus on
the long-run equilibrium value ˆ k2 that, under some conditions, presents a positive rate
of growth. In our model for a given combination (Q,C),φdetermines the value that
the individual places on one extra unit of environmental services in terms of consumption
therefore a rise in φ can be interpreted as a change in consumer’s preferences for a cleaner
environment.
The analysis of the eﬀects of greener preferences can be easily conducted from Eq.
(27) if we divide both sides of the equation by φ. The result is that in this case only the
RHS of the equation depends (negatively) on φ. Then as the two critical values of the
RHS, the maximum and the intersection point, do not depend on φ, an increase in φ
shifts the RHS curve downward causing a decrease in ˆ k2.
18The eﬀect on the ratio of consumption to capital can be evaluated also easily using
optimal policy function (15). In this case we ﬁnd that greener preferences have an am-
biguous eﬀect on ˆ x2. Finally, (19) can be used to evaluate the eﬀect on the growth rate.
As (19) does not depend on φ, the eﬀect on the rate of growth depends on whether ˆ k2
i sg r e a t e ro rl o w e rt h a nαλ/(1 − α)γ, the value for k that yields the maximum rate of
growth. See Fig. 2. Thus, although there exists the possibility that greener preferences
have a positive eﬀect on the growth rate of the economy, the sign of the eﬀect is not
determined and a change in consumer’s preferences for a cleaner environment could also
cause a negative eﬀect on growth. Moreover, it seems clear that the greener the pref-
erences, the lower the possibilities that a change in preferences has a positive eﬀect on
growth. As an increase in φ reduces ˆ k2 the higher φ, the lower ˆ k2, then according to
Fig. 2, the higher the possibilities that ˆ k2 is lower than αλ/(1 − α)γ. Thus, for a great
enough value for φ, it should be expected that ˆ k2 is lower than αλ/(1 − α)γ and in that
case any change in the preferences for a cleaner environment would cause a reduction on
the growth rate. Similar results were obtained by Smulders and Gradus (1996) in their
model with pollution abatement.
4 The Environmental Kuznets Curve
As along the BGP the marginal productivity of capital and the ratio of output to capital
must be constant we can represent the BGP using the production function as it shown
in Fig. 3.
⇒ FIGURE 3 ⇐
The ﬁgure shows how the technological progress moves up the curve of production
and how the BGP line goes through all the points with the same productivity of capital.
From the ﬁgure is clear the dynamics of capital depends on its initial value. If K0 is lower
than ˆ K0, that it is deﬁned as ˆ K0 = ˆ kz0, then there is transitional dynamics to the BGP.
Notice that investment in R&D is irreversible so that it is not possible to moves down
the production function. Thus, in the ﬁgure the ﬁrst production curve is a technological
frontier deﬁned by the dirtiest technology available.
19Thus, if K0 is lower than ˆ K0 as it occurs in Figure 3, the shadow price of a cleaner
technology is low relative to the cost of developing it and as we pointed out in Section
3, the technological development is not worth investing in. Then during a ﬁrst stage,













that characterize the optimal capital accumulation without technological progress in a
polluted environment.14





















which describe the transitional dynamics of the economy. Without population growth or
exogenous technological progress, this model does not present a BGP. For this reason, we
conduct the analysis of the transitional dynamics in this Section in terms of the levels of
C and K.


















provided that α>λ φ .
To analyze the stability of the dynamic system we rewrite it as follows








˙ K = AK
αz
1−α
0 − C, (41)
14See for instance the papers by Forster (1973) or Selden and Song (1995).




































Partial derivatives (42) and (43) can be simpliﬁed using stationary condition, ˙ C =0 .
From this condition we know that λφC/K = αA(z0/K)1−α −ρ, that allows us to rewrite



































we obtain the following expression for the Jacobian determinant: |JSS| = −(1−α)ρ2/(α−
λφ), that is negative. This implies that the two roots of the characteristic equation have
opposite signs, which establishes the steady state is locally a saddle point. Thus, we
obtain
Proposition 4 If α>λ φthe dynamic system (40)-(41) has a unique positive steady
state that is saddle point.
For this kind of stationary points there are two stable branches leading to the steady
state in the phase diagram, and then there exists an optimal path to approach the steady
state as it is illustrated in Fig. 4.
⇒ FIGURE 4 ⇐
However, the stable path is not so relevant in our analysis as it is the localization of
the transition point to the BGP deﬁned by the interior solution and the localization of the
21initial stock of capital. As the ﬁgure shows the transition path must not be necessarily on
the stable path. The transition point is deﬁned by the following values for the capital and
consumption: ˆ K0 = ˆ kz0 and ˆ C0 =ˆ x ˆ K0. Then if the transition point belongs to the area
of the phase diagram where both the capital and consumption are increasing, there will
exist a unique path that leads to the transition point provided that K0 < ˆ K0. Thus, there
is a ﬁrst stage during which the capital, consumption and pollution rise monotonically
and the economy reaches the transition point ( ˆ K0, ˆ C0) in ﬁnite time. This path in Fig.
4 corresponds to the movement along the production curve F(z0,K) from K0 in Fig.
3. Once, the transition point is reached, the economy grows at the rate of technological
progress and the environmental quality increases. The result is that during a ﬁrst stage,
the environmental quality is decreasing to increase later yielding an EKC.
Finally, we would like to clarify that an EKC can appear even if condition α>λ φ
of Prop. 4 is not satisﬁed since the only condition we need to obtain a ﬁrst stage with
increasing pollution is that the transition point is in the area of the phase diagram where
both the capital and consumption are increasing.
4.1 Numerical example
We ﬁnish this Section with a numerical illustration whose aim is to show the possibility
of our theoretical results, rather than to account for reality. Table 1 summarizes the
parameters upon which our simulations are based.
⇒ TABLE 1 ⇐
Following Cassou and Hamilton (2004) we assume that the negative eﬀect of pollution
on production reduces β by 0.05 that for a standard value of 0.4 for β yields α =0 .35.
The remaining parameters that describes preferences and technology in the baseline cal-
ibration are selected simultaneously to satisfy condition β + χ(γ − λ)=1 , to match a
growth rate of 0.02, a ratio of consumption to capital in the interval [0.15,0.25] and a
growth rate of the environmental quality along the BGP in the interval [0.02,0.06]. For
the values of Table 1 the values that characterize the BGP are ˆ k =0 .51 and ˆ x =0 .16.15
15The range of the interval for the ratio of consumption to capital includes acceptable values for this
22Observe that ˆ k belongs to interval [α2/(1−α2)=0 .1396,α/(1−α)=0 .5385] so that
according to Prop. 3 the long-run equilibrium (ˆ k =0 .51, ˆ x =0 .16, ˆ g =0 .02) is unstable.
If we normalize z0 =1 , ˆ K0 in Fig. 3 is equal to ˆ k =0 .51, then if the initial value of
capital is lower than this ﬁgure, the economy will evolve during a ﬁrst stage according to
the ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equations system given by (40)-(41):
˙ C =4 .9525 × 10
−2 C




˙ K =0 .1415K
0.35 − C. (47)
We have solved this system by the time elimination method using Matlab 7.0 for
K0 =1 0 −4 and the transition values ˆ K0 =0 .51 and ˆ C0 =ˆ x ˆ K0 =0 .0816. Notice that,
as we do not want to approach the steady state represented in Fig. 4 but the transition
point, it is not necessary to use the eigenvector procedure to determine the slopes of the
policy function, C(K), at the steady state. See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martín (1993) for
more details about this procedure. The policy function obtained applying this method is
showed in Fig. 5 and corresponds to the path drawn in Fig. 4 that leaves from the initial
stock of capital. This means that the transition point ( ˆ K0, ˆ C0) is in the area of the phase
diagram where both the capital and consumption are increasing and that, moreover, it
can be reached from the initial value of capital.
⇒ FIGURE 5 ⇐
Once the policy function C(K) has been computed, time must be reintroduced. The
time path of K can be computed by solving the initial-value problem
˙ K =0 .1415K
0.35 − C(K),K (0) = 0.0001. (48)
Then, we compute the time T at which K(T)= ˆ K0. Thus, during the interval [0,T],k (t)
is equal to K(t) since we have normalized z0 =1 . From time t = T on, the optimal path
is k(t)=ˆ k =0 .51.
variable in the developed economies. On the other hand, the range of the interval for the rate of growth
of the environmental quality could include lower values both for the upper and lower limits without
causing any qualitative change in the dynamics of the environmental quality that is showed in Fig. 6.
23Finally, environmental services are given by function Q(t)=K(t)−0.25 during the in-
terval [0,T] so that environmental quality decreases with capital until its transition value,
ˆ Q = ˆ K
−0.25
0 , is reached at T. From time t = T on, environmental quality is increasing
because of the investment in abatement technologies. The result is an Environmental
Kuznets Curve as the one showed in Fig. 6.
⇒ FIGURE 6 ⇐
Next, we conclude this section developing a sensitivity analysis of the results. Firstly,
we would like to point out that for the benchmark parameters values a change in consumer
preferences for a cleaner environment has a positive eﬀect on growth. For these values,
the value of k that maximizes the growth rate in Fig.2 is equal to 0.04, clearly below
the steady-state value for k. In this case, a marginal increase in φ reduces k causing
a raise in the growth rate. Moreover, it is easy to check that this will occur for any
φ greater than the benchmark value. Using (27) we ﬁnd that limφ→+∞ k =0 .17643
that is lower than the value of k that maximizes the growth rate, thus for any φ ∈
[0.0133,+∞), ˆ k ∈ (αλ/(1−α)γ,¯ k2) in Fig. 2 and an increase in φ raises the growth rate
of the economy. Thus, we can conclude that ˆ k is decreasing with respect to φ and ˆ g is
increasing with respect to φ in the interval [0.0133,+∞). To go further in the sensitivity
analysis we have solved the model for the combination of the following values of the
parameters φ =( 0 .0133, 0.0633, 0.1133, 0.1633, 0.2133),α=( 0 .325, 0.350, 0.375)
and ρ =( 0 .0400, 0.0500, 0.0562). For the forty-ﬁve cases analyzed, we have found the
following regularities. A change in consumer preferences for a cleaner environment has a
negative eﬀect on the ratio of consumption to capital whereas an increase in the rate of
discount has a positive eﬀect on this ratio but a negative eﬀect on the capital per unit of
eﬀective labor and on the rate of growth. These are standard eﬀects for a variation in the
rate of discount. Finally, we have considered diﬀerent values for α in order to take into
account diﬀerent impacts of the environment on production. The results of the sensitivity
analysis indicate that the greater the impacts of the environment on production, i.e. the
lower is α, the greater the growth rate and the ratio of consumption to capital and the
lower the capital per unit of eﬀective labor. Thus, we have that when the environmental
24quality enhances the productivity of capital and labor, the greater the eﬀects of the
environmental quality on production the greater the eﬀects of investment in R&D on
productivity which allows to support greater rates of growth for the economy with greater
ratios of consumption to capital based in cleaner technologies. Finally, we would like to
highlight that for all the cases our algorithm works provided the initial stock of capital
is low and the optimal investment pattern yields an U-shaped proﬁle for the dynamics of
the environmental quality. Thus, the EKC can be seen as a natural corner solution for
an economy that evolves from a pristine natural environment.
5 Conlusions
This paper has investigated socially optimal patterns of economic growth and pollution
in a neoclassical growth model with endogenous technological progress. In the model we
assume that quality of natural environment is (indirectly) a production factor. More-
over, we assume that investment in environmentally oriented R&D allows to produce
the output with a cleaner technology but, as pollution aﬀects negatively production, the
investment in R&D also enhances the productivity of capital and labor. In this frame-
work, if the initial stock of capital is low, and consequently consumption is also low, it is
not proﬁtable to invest in R&D and all the investment eﬀort is directed to accumulate
capital and increase consumption resulting in an increase of pollution. This increases the
shadow price of a cleaner technology and reduces the cost of developing it until that it is
proﬁtable to invest in R&D and use a cleaner technology. Then if the new technologies
are eﬃcient to compensate the negative eﬀects on the environment of the accumulation of
capital, it is possible to growth and increase environmental quality. The result is that the
optimal investment pattern in capital and R&D supports an inverted-U-shaped pattern of
pollution to countries’ income. The second part of this pattern is explained because our
model behaves an AK model along the BGP so that the marginal productivity of capital
becomes constant. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a change in consumer’s preferences for
a cleaner environment has an eﬀect on the growth rate that depends on the degree of
environmental conscience of consumers. However, for the numerical example this condi-
25tion does not work and we obtain that there is no conﬂict between the environmental
preservation and the economic growth. The reason that explains the positive inﬂuence
of greener preferences on growth is that greener preferences increase the investment in
R&D causing an increase in productivity that can support a greater rate of growth for
the economy. In the numerical example this occurs for any the degree of consumers’
environmental conscience .
The main lesson for the design of the climate change policies that can be learnt for our
model is that we cannot trust only on economic growth to face this problem. Polluting
ﬁrms can be interested in investment in abatement technologies because of the positive
eﬀects that the environmental quality has on production. However, even in this case, the
investment is not going to be optimal since the environmental quality is a public good. In
fact, for the case of the climate change, the environmental quality is a global public good
and we have to expect that the decentralized equilibrium is pretty far from the optimal
allocation of the resources to the R&D sector of the economy. Thus the environmental
policy should close this gap promoting energetically the investment of the polluting ﬁrms
in abatement technologies.
Diﬀerent lines for future research can be envisaged. First, we would like to consider
a more general utility function that admits diﬀerent values for the elasticity of the in-
tertemporal substitution. Nevertheless, we guess that this is not a key parameter in the
explanation of the EKC presented in this paper that is based on technological change.
Another obvious extension is to study how the social planner solution can be implemented
through diﬀerent instrument of environmental policy. Another direction that could be
developed is to consider a bisectorial growth model that allows us to incorporate diﬀerent
types of technological progress in the line of the papers published by Cassou and Hamil-
ton (2004), Hart (2004), Grimaud and Rouge (2008) and Reis et al. (2008). However, as
Cassou and Hamilton (2004) have shown, we think that the same proﬁle for the dynamics
of the environmental quality will be obtained but in this case explained by a change in
the sectorial composition of the total output. Finally, it could be also considered that
environmental damages are related to a stock pollutant.
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Figure 2. Interval for k with positive growth rates.
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Figure 4. Phase diagram in (K,C) space. Case α>λ φ .
Figure 5. Policy function C(K)
31Figure 6. The Environmental Kuznets Curve
Preference parameters φ =0 .0133 ρ =0 .0562
Technological parameters A =0 .1415 α =0 .3500 λ =0 .2500 γ =3 .2500
TABLE 1. Benchmark parameters
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